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Abstract: A multi hop mobile ad hoc network is a peer to peer network of wireless 
nodes where nodes are required to perform routing activity to provide end to end 
connectivity among nodes. As mobile nodes are constrained by battery power and 
bandwidth, some nodes may behave selfishly and deny forwarding packets for other 
nodes, even though they expect other nodes to forward packets to keep network 
connected. We simulate two selfish behaviors on top of Dynamic Source Routing 
(DSR) protocol: the first, selfish nodes do not forward data or control packets (routing 
packets) for other nodes and the second, selfish nodes turn off their network interface 
card when they have nothing to communicate. We compare the energy saving to the 
selfish nodes for both the misbehaviors and show that the second selfish behavior 
saves more energy. This is important result because most of the cooperation 
enforcement mechanisms in literature, except PCOM [2], address the first selfish 
behavior. Also, the second selfish behavior can be easily done by layman users 
without any protocol level changes. Secondly, with our simulation study we find that 
in dense mobile ad hoc networks where route breakages are frequent, routing control 
packets consume significant fraction of node energy and selfish behavior by certain 
number of nodes reduce the overall routing overhead in network which in turn result 
in energy saving for both, well behaving nodes and selfish nodes. 
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1. Introduction  
A Mobile Ad hoc Network is a collection of wireless nodes communicating with each other in 
the absence of any infrastructure. Due to this infrastructure less feature, all networking functions 
must be performed by the nodes themselves. Packets sent between distant nodes are expected to 
be relayed by intermediate nodes, which act as routers and provide the forwarding service. As 
mention in [1] mobile nodes are typically constrained by power and computing resources, a 
selfish node may not be willing to use its computing and energy resources to forward packets 
that are not directly beneficial to it, even though it expects others to forward packets on its behalf.  
 In this work, we analyze the effect of selfish behavior on energy consumption in MANET. 
We studied various selfish behaviors in literature (Section 2: Related Work) and identified the 
following two representative selfish behaviors for simulation and analysis: 1) forwarding node 
selfish behavior: selfish nodes do not forward data or control packets (routing packets) for other 
nodes and 2) network card on/off selfish behavior: selfish nodes turn off their network interface 
card when they have nothing to communicate. We compare the energy saving to the selfish 
nodes for both the misbehaviors and show that the second selfish behavior saves more energy. 
We consider this as an important finding because as per our knowledge almost all the 
cooperation enforcement mechanisms except PCOM [2] address the first selfish behavior. Please 
refer to [1, 4, 5, 6, 14, 15] for cooperation enforcement mechanisms addressing forwarding node 
selfish behavior. 
 Secondly, we find that in dense mobile topology ad hoc networks selfish behavior by certain 
number of nodes reduce the overall routing overhead in network which in turn result in energy 
saving for both, well behaving nodes and selfish nodes. We find that in mobile topology network 
scenario route caching mechanism of DSR is not effective and every link break results in route 
request flooding in the network. As in the dense network there are excessive number of nodes 
participating in route discovery, selfish behavior by certain number of nodes prunes some route 
discovery paths which in turn reduces the overall energy consumption of selfish nodes and other 
nodes along the pruned path and still keeps network connected. 
This paper is organized as follows:  section 2 discusses related work; Section 3 is about 
simulation setup; section 4 presents simulation analysis; and section 5 presents our major 
conclusions and future work. 
2. Related Work 
     The limitation in energy resources along with the multi-hop nature of Mobile Ad hoc 
Networks (MANETs) causes a new vulnerability that does not exist in traditional networks. To 
preserve its own battery, a node may behave selfishly. We identified following selfish behavior 
from literature. In Forwarding Node Selfish Behavior [6], selfish nodes do not participate 
correctly in routing function by not advertising available routes or by not forwarding route 
request packets. Consequently, such selfish nodes will not appear on packet forwarding path. In 
MAC Selfish Behavior [7], a selfish host can deliberately misuse the MAC (Medium Access 
Control) protocol to gain more network resources than well behaved hosts. For example, IEEE 
802.11 requires hosts competing for the channel to wait for backoff interval before any 
transmissions. A selfish host may choose to wait for a smaller backoff interval, thereby 
increasing its chance of accessing the channel and hence reducing the throughput share received 
by well-behaved stations. In Packet Dropper misbehavir [8], a selfish node drops all the data 
packets which come to them for forwarding. This is the most studied misbehavior in literature 
and most of the existing solutions to deal with this misbehavior rely on the watchdog mechanism 
[1]. In Partial Dropping misbehavir [9], selfish node circumvents the watchdog by dropping 
packets at a lower rate than the watchdog's configured minimum misbehavior threshold. In False 
Misbehavior Accusations misbehavir [9], a node may falsely report other innocent nodes in its 
neighborhood as misbehaving to avoid getting packets to forward. In Insufficient Transmission 
Power selfish behavior, a Selfish node controls its transmission power to circumvent the 
watchdog at the neighbor nodes. If the toppoly is A-B-C and if A is closer to B than C, then B 
could attempt to save its energy by adjusting its transmission power and makes it strong enough 
to be overheard by the predecessor node (A) but less than the required power to reach the true 
recipient (C). Selfish nodes can also take advantage of Imperfect Monitoring mechanisms [10]. 
When the miss detect ratio is high, a selfish node can always drop other nodes' packets but still 
claim that it has forwarded. In Set TTL Field to Zero selfish behavior [11], a selfish node may 
drop routing packets or forward with a time-to-live (TTL) of 0 so that no paths passing through 
them can be established. A selfish node could thereby avoid forwarding many subsequent data 
packets. Another selfish behavior is to make paths that include  selfish node seem longer than 
they really are, perhaps by artificially increasing hop counts [11] so the source nodees are more 
likely to choose other routes those appear to be  shorter. A selfish user may disobey the rules to 
access the wireless channel in order to obtain a higher throughput than the other nodes [12]. A 
selfish user can also change the congestion avoidance parameters of TCP in order to obtain 
unfair advantage over the rest of the nodes in the network. Also, a selfish user can manipulate 
rules of the MAC layer. In 802.11, the selfish node can manipulate the size of the Network 
Allocation Vector (NAV) and assign large idle time periods to its neighbors, it can decrease the 
size of Interframe Spaces (both SIFS and DIFS), it can select small backoff values, it can un-
authenticated neighboring nodes etc. In Emulate Link Breakage selfish behavior [13], when 
source node (A) want to transmit packet to next node (B) on certain route R, if B is selfish , it 
can simply keep silent to let A believe that B is out of A's transmission range. The laymen uses 
without skills to falsify program codes or data maliciously can follow Network Card On/Off 
selfish behavior [2].  This behavior involves refusing to forward any control or data packets for 
others by turning off the power of network card or by turning off the communication function 
when they do not need to communicate. 
We simulated two selfish behaviors from literature study 1) forwarding node selfish behavior: 
selfish nodes do not forward data or control packets (routing packets) for other nodes and 2) 
network card on/off selfish behavior: selfish nodes turn off their network interface card when 
they have nothing to communicate. We simulate forwarding node selfish behavior because it 
targets forwarding functionality of DSR protocol and most of the research work has been done 
on this selfish behavior. So we need to evaluate whether this behavior saves more energy 
compare to other selfish behavior specified in literature. We simulate network card on/off 
behavior [2] because it can easily deployed by laymen user. 
3. Simulation 
 Simulations have been carried out in order to analyze the effect of selfish behavior on 
network card power function and packet forwarding function of DSR [3] protocol. We focused 
our attention on the evaluation of network performance in terms of routing overhead, throughput 
and energy consumption of a mobile ad hoc network where a defined number of nodes were 
misbehaving.   
 
3.1 Simulation Setup 
 We conducted exhaustive simulations in the simulation tool NS-2.34[20, 21]. The simulation 
parameters are listed in Table 1. We used Random Way Point model [18] because we were not 
targeting particular application. In each traffic pattern, 50 sessions are constantly maintained to 
keep every node involved in networking. The results are averaged of 10 simulation rounds 
conducted with various random seeds. We set maximum number of packet as 10000 for 
forwarding node misbehavior which is large enough to continue session till end of the simulation 
time. We also set maximum number of packet as 300 for network card on/off misbehavior which 
is large enough to see the effect of this selfish behavior. Physical layer parameters are taken 
according to wavelan card specification [16, 17]. 
 
Table 1. Simulation Parameter. 
General Parameter Energy Model Parameter 
Number of Nodes 50 Transmit Power 1.65 W 
Topology Static & Mobile Receiving Power 1.40 W 
Simulation Time 1000 Sleep Mode 0.045 W 
MAC Layer 802.11 Idle Mode 0.843 W 
Range 200 meters Initial Energy 1500 J 
Simulation Area 1000 x 1000 meter2     
Traffic Model Parameter 
Traffic Model Constant Bit Rate Traffic Model Poisson 
Packet Size 512 Bytes Interval 1 Sec 
Interval 1 Sec Rate 1 Mb 
4. Observations  
4.1. Forwarding Node Selfish Behavior 
     Selfish node does not perform packet forwarding function of DSR protocol. Node with this 
kind of selfish behavior also does not participate in route discovery phase of DSR protocol. 
4.1.1. Static Topology with Constant Bit Rate Traffic 
     In static topology, routes are established at the beginning of session and remain valid 
throughout the session. So route overhead is low compare to dynamic topology and do not 
consume more energy. From Figure 1 we can say that as number of selfish node increase in 
network, good node need to do more work to compensate the selfish node work. So good node 
need to spend more energy to complete the work. Simulation result show that selfish nodes save 
more energy as number of selfish node increase in network.  
 
Figure 1. Residual Energy Vs 
Number of Selfish Nodes for static 
topology 
 
Figure 2. Residual Energy Vs 
Number of Selfish Nodes for 
dynamic topology 
4.1.2 Dynamic Topology with Constant Bit Rate Traffic 
    Figure 2 shows the simulating result of dynamic topology network scenario. In this 
scenario as well, good nodes consume more energy than selfish nodes. However the energy 
saving increases for good nodes as well as selfish nodes as number of selfish nodes increase in 
network. This is counter intuitive and we identified following reason for it:  
    In mobile topology network scenario, link breakages are frequent and routing caching 
mechanism of DSR is not effective.  So routing overhead is a major component in energy 
consumption. When node density is high and all the nodes participate in flooding based route 
discovery, nodes consume more energy.  When some nodes behave selfishly, they prune all route 
requests coming to them. This behavior saves energy for the selfish nodes and all the other nodes 
following the node on path towards destination. This has the effect of reducing the node density 
of network. So selfish nodes reduce number of control packet in network hence reduce energy 
consumption of good nodes as well as selfish nodes. 
Figure 3 shows that as number of selfish nodes increases in dynamic topology dense network, 
the routing overhead decreases. Routing overhead is monitored in terms of number of routing 
control packets in the network. Due to drastic decrease in routing overhead, overall network 
become efficient and good nodes as well as selfish nodes saves energy. 
Figure 4 shows the throughput of network with varying number of selfish nodes. Throughput 
is measured as ratio of total number of packets successfully delivered to destination nodes and 
total number of packets generated by source nodes. As number of selfish nodes increases up to 
certain level, the network throughput increases due to reduction in number of collisions. We 
observe the decrease in throughput after the threshold point (more than twenty selfish nodes in 
network). This is due to the fact that as more and more nodes behave selfishly, network becomes 
partitioned and nodes face difficulty in establishing end to end path from source to destination. 
 
  
Figure 3. Route overhead Vs Num. 
of Selfish Nodes 
Figure 4. Throughput  Vs Num. of 
Selfish Nodes 
4.1.3 Dynamic Topology with Poisson Traffic 
 As we obtained counter intuitive results for energy consumption of nodes in dynamic 
topology mobile ad hoc network for CBR traffic (both good nodes and selfish nodes save energy 
as number of selfish nodes increases), we wanted to validate our simulation results for Poisson 
traffic as well. Figure 5 shows the simulation results of dynamic topology network scenario with 
Poisson traffic. In this scenario as well, good nodes consume more energy than selfish nodes. 
However the energy saving increases for good nodes as well as selfish nodes as number of 
selfish nodes increase in network. This is the similar result as we obtained for CBR traffic: In 
mobile topology network scenario, routing overhead is a major component in energy 
consumption and selfish behavior by certain number of nodes reduces the routing overhead 
significantly in the network which in turn results in energy saving for both, the good nodes as 
well as the selfish nodes.   
 
Figure 5. Residual Energy Vs Number of 
Selfish Nodes  
 
Figure 6. Route overhead Vs Num. of Selfish 
Nodes 
Figure 6 shows that as number of selfish nodes increases in dynamic topology dense network, 
the routing overhead decreases. Routing overhead is monitored in terms of number of routing 
control packets in the network. Due to drastic decrease in routing overhead, overall network 
become efficient and good nodes as well as selfish nodes saves energy. 
 
4.2. Wireless Network Card On/Off Selfish behavior 
 
4.2.1. Static Topology with CBR Traffic 
Figure 7 shows effect of number of selfish nodes on energy consumption of good nodes and 
selfish nodes for static topology network scenario. Here also selfish nodes save more energy than 
well behaving nodes but energy saving for selfish nodes is much more with this selfish behavior 
when compared to that with forwarding node selfish behavior. 
 
 Figure 7. Residual Energy Vs Num. of 
Selfish Node For Static Topology 
 
Figure 8. Residual Energy Vs Num. of Selfish 
Node For Dynamic Topology 
 
4.2.2. Dynamic Topology with CBR Traffic 
Figure 8 shows effect of number of selfish nodes on energy consumption of good nodes and 
selfish nodes for dynamic topology network scenario. Here also selfish nodes save more energy 
than good nodes. With this selfish behavior as well, as number of selfish nodes increases in 
network, good nodes also save energy. The main reason for this is reduction in routing overhead 
as more and more nodes turn off their network card.  
 
4.3 Comparison of Selfish Behaviors 
Figure 9 shows the comparison between energy consumption of two selfish behaviors that we 
have simulated, namely, forwarding node misbehavior and network card on/off selfish behavior.  
Simulating result shows that Network Card On/Off Selfish Behavior saves much more energy 
compare to Forwarding Packet Selfish Behavior for selfish nodes. 
 
Figure 9. Comparison of Selfish Behaviors 
We consider this as an important finding because as per our knowledge almost all the 
cooperation enforcement mechanisms except PCOM [2] address the first selfish behavior [1, 4, 5, 
6, 14, 15]. Figure 9 shows residual energy of selfish nodes only. 
5. Conclusion  
In this paper, we simulate two representative selfish behaviors namely forwarding node 
selfish behavior and network card on/off selfish behavior on top of DSR. We compare the energy 
saving to the selfish nodes for both the misbehaviors and show that network card on/off selfish 
behavior saves more energy. This is very important observation because most of the cooperation 
enforcement mechanisms proposed in literature addresses the forwarding node selfish behavior. 
Secondly, with our simulation study we find that in dense mobile ad hoc networks where 
route breakages are frequent, routing control packets consumes significant fraction of node 
energy and selfish behavior by certain number of nodes reduce the overall routing overhead in 
network which in turn result in energy saving for both, well behaving nodes and selfish nodes. 
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